I wonder how the metro gets by without the controllers talking to the
drivers. Oh wait.
On Thursday, 9 March 2023 at 09:42:03 UTC+11peterm...@... wrote:
> COntroller duplication, update one and leave the standby on the previous
> software version and fail over to the older version.
> On Thursday, 9 March 2023 at 09:01:12 UTC+11 Matthew Geier wrote:
>> On Wed, 8 Mar 2023 at 17:39, Tony Galloway a...@...> wrote:
>>> Wasn’t that long ago there was no 2-way radio, digital or otherwise, and
>>> trains ran just fine.
>>> Now everything stops without it - what a joke.
>>> Must be that wonderful ever onwards “march of progress” that makes
>>> everything work so much better.
>>> Someone (a group of managers more like it) has written the operation of
>> the train radio system into the SMS and made it a 'vital' system so if that
>> system is not operational, they are not meeting all requirements for 'safe
>> Never mind the railways ran for 100 years without radios and fancy
>> digital trunked comms systems.
>> Seems the concept of a driver looking out the front window and observing
>> the status of the signal lamps beside the track is no longer considered
>> There was no suggestion that interlockings had failed, or the actual
>> train control systems were down, what they lost was the network-wide
>> GSM-R-based train radio system. They couldn't talk between operations
>> control and trains in the field.
>> I observed the Cronulla branch being operated as a shuttle during the
>> outage, showing some initiative on the part of Sutherland station master to
>> take local control of the Cronulla branch. I've seen reports that Blacktown
>> did the same for the Richmond branch.
>> I just hope the relevant staff now don't get reprimanded for 'unsafe
>> operations' for showing some initiative to keep things running. Not all
>> station staff are safe working qualified anymore - I do wonder how they
>> will formally withdraw the qualifications from SMs that still hold safe
>> working qualifications, preventing any further local control initiative
>> taking on their part again.
>> They did a software update of the train radio controllers on the weekend.
>> I suspect that update wasn't tested under a full load of a busy system - or
>> tested long enough - the new software having a 'slow leak', so that it only
>> works for a few days - then falls over.
>> Vital systems should have redundant controllers with the software of each
>> written by different teams so that the two don't have the same bugs. But
>> that's expensive - doing all your R&D twice.